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HOMICIDE IN RESPONSE TO 
A THREAT OF RAPE: 
A THEORETICAL 
EXAMINATION OF 
THE RULE OF 
JUSTIFICATION 
Judith Fabricant* 
The intentional killing of a human being is the most serious 
of crimes.1 Nevertheless, the law declines to punish homicides 
when they are committed under certain circumstances. The 
most broadly recognized defense against criminal liability for 
homicide is that of self-defense. The law permits homicide not 
only in defense of life, but also, under certain circumstances, in 
defense of such interests as property, liberty, and physical integ-
rity.2 That one who kills an aggressor in defense of his or her 
own life should escape punishment is hardly susceptible of seri-
ous debate. The privilege of self-defense under these circum-
stances is universally recognized, and legal scholars have devel-
oped coherent explanations for it. s When the aggressor threatens 
interests other than life itself, however, the rationale for the 
* J.D., Yale Law School, 1980. Ms. Fabricant is an associate with a Boston law firm. 
The author wishes to express her gratitude to Professors Jay Katz and Steven Duke of 
the Yale Law School for their invaluable criticism and guidance. 
1. One commentator describes life as the highest value because it is the prerequisite 
to the enjoyment of all other values. Kadish, Respect for Life and Regard for Rights in 
the Criminal Law, 64 CALIF. L. REv. 871, 871 (1976). According to Blackstone, the taking 
of life is the most important crime because life "is the immediate gift of God to man." 
W. BLACKSTONE, 4 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAw OF ENGLAND 1432 (W. Lewis ed. 1897). 
2. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 143(2) (1965); E. COKE, THE TmRD PART 
OF THE INsTITUTEs OF THE LAW OF ENGLAND 55 (London 1809); M. FOSTER, CROWN LAw 
273-74 (London 1767); M. HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 28-31 (London 1678); W. LA FAYE 
& A. SCOTT, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAw 403 (1972); J. LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF CIVIL 
GOVERNMENT § 7, at 289-90 (P. Lasset ed. 1967); J. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAw 981 (1969). 
3. See, e.g., G. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 860 (1978); M. FosTER, supra 
note 2, at 273-74; J. LOCKE, supra note 2, § 7, at 289; Fletcher, Proportionality and the 
Psychotic Aggressor: A Vignette in Comparative Criminal Theory, 8 IsRAEL L. REv. 367 
(1967); Wechsler & Michael, A Rationale for the Law of Homicide, 37 COLUM. L. REv. 
701 (1937). 
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law's acceptance of a homicidal response is less obvious. But the 
development of such a rationale is crucial to any critical evalua-
tion of legal rules distinguishing between aggression which justi-
fies or excuses the use of deadly force and that which does not. 
One form of nondeadly aggression which can provoke a 
homicidal defensive reaction is the threat of rape. Anglo-Ameri-
can law has consistently recognized the right of a woman to de-
fend herself against rape, even by killing her assailant! Al-
though this rule of justification may be nullified in application 
by prosecutors and juries, G the legal privilege has persisted even 
as the law of self-defense has narrowed in other respects.6 
Although courts and commentators have recognized the rule 
almost without exception, they have failed to formulate any co-
4. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 17 (West Supp. 1981), 197 (West 1970), 264 (West 
Supp. 1981). In California, homicide is justifiable when committed by a person resisting 
an attempt to commit a felony. ld. § 197. Felony is defined as any crime punishable by 
death or by imprisonment in the state prison. ld. § 17. Rape is punishable by imprison-
ment in the state prison. ld. § 264; see also ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 7-1 (Smith-Hurd 
1972) (use of deadly force justified to prevent a forcible felony), § 2-8 (rape is a forcible 
felony); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:3-4(b)(2)(I)(b)(iii) (West 1980) (deadly force justified if 
necessary to prevent against death or serious bodily harm); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 
35.15(2)(b) (McKinney 1975) (deadly force against another person justifiable in the rea-
sonable belief that such other person is committing or attempting to commit a kidnap-
ping, forcible rape, forcible sodomy or robbery); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 505(b)(2} 
(Purdon 1973) (deadly force justifiable if actor reasonably believes it necessary to protect 
against sexual intercourse compelled by force or threat); TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 
9.32(3)(b} (Vernon 1974) (deadly force against another justified to prevent the imminent 
commission of rape or aggravated rape). 
See also MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(2)(b)(l} (Tent. Draft No.8, 1958); RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 65(b) (1965); W. BLACKSTONE, supra note I, at 1605-12; M. HALE, 
supra note 2, at 28-31; M. FOSTER, supra note 2, at 274; J. PERKINS, supra note 2, at 99. 
5. After the conviction of Inez Garcia in her first trial for killing her rapist, a juror 
told interviewers that, "You can't kill someone for trying to give you a good time." 
Schneider & Jordon, Representation of Women Who Defend Themselves in Response to 
Physical or Sexual Assault, 4 WOMEN'S RIGHTS REP., 149, 154 (1978). In Woods v. State, 
240 Ga. 265, 239 S.E.2d 786 (1977), two women claimed self-defense against rape as a 
defense to a murder charge. The trial judge refused to dismiss for cause a juror who had 
expressed disapproval of killing to avoid rape. The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the 
conviction. See also S. BROWNMILLER, AGAINST Oua WILL: MEN, WOMEN, AND RAPE 356 
(1975), quoting a woman who disabled a potential rapist with a kick to the groin, and 
was subsequently advised by police that, had he died, she would have faced a charge of 
manslaughter. 
6. See, e.g., W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, supra note 2, at 399. MODEL PENAL CODE § 
3.06(3)(d)(ii) (Tent. Draft. No.8, 1958), provides a narrower rule on the law of self-
defense against property crimes than that of the common law as stated in M. HALE, 
supra note 2, at 28-31, and E. COKE, supra note 2, at 55. 
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herent theoretical explanation for it in the context of self-de-
fense doctrine and of the criminal law generally. This paper will 
attempt to identify the historical rationale for the privilege of 
self-defense and the application of that rationale to justify homi-
cide in defense against rape. It will then evaluate the continua-
tion of the privilege of self-defense against rape by application 
of the historical rationale to the experience of rape in the con-
text of modern America. 
This paper will attempt to show the criminal law has per-
mitted homicide when committed in order to prevent crimes 
which threaten harm so severe and permanent as to be incapable 
of repair through subsequent legal proceedings. Rape has con-
sistently been regarded as such a crime. The paper will identify 
the interests which rape has been seen to threaten as those in-
terests which derive their significance from a social system in 
which women are the property of men. It will argue that, to the 
extent changing social values have reduced the significance of 
those interests, they are no longer adequate to support the privi-
lege of homicidal self-defense against rape. To evaluate the cur-
rent legitimacy of the rule, it is necessary to identify the harm of 
rape in the modern social context and to decide whether that 
harm is irreparable. This paper will attempt to identify at least 
some of the interests threatened by rape and to show how the 
deprivation of those interests might be irreparable, so as to jus-
tify a continuing privilege of homicidal self-defense. 
For purposes of this paper, rape is defined as sexual inter-
course involving some degree of genital penetration, accom-
plished by force or threat of force. Most of what follows would 
apply as well to anal penetration of one man by another, or even 
to penetration with an object by or upon a person of either sex. 
The paradigm of genital penetration of a female by a male is 
used because it is the most common form of sexual assault and 
because it is the type envisioned in the formulation of the com-
mon law rules. Consensual acts in which consent is legally inva-
lid because of minority or incompetence, and those in which 
consent is obtained by fraud, are not considered because such 
cases are unlikely to give rise to homicidal acts of self-defense, 
and because the interests affected by such acts differ from those 
affected by forcible rape. 
3
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I. THE RATIONALE-FOR THE PRIVILEGE OF HOMICI-
DAL SELF -DEFENSE 
Defenses to criminal liability are assertions of facts that 
identify the act as one which, although within a general category 
defined as criminal, the state declines to punish. The early com-
mon law recognized the defense of crime prevention as a justifi-
cation; the act was proper, and therefore not prohibited.7 The 
doctrine of crime prevention justified a homicide committed by 
an innocent actor if necessary to prevent an "atrocious crime."s 
The defense applied whether the crime prevented had been di-
rected at the actor or at a third party. If the act met the defini-
tion of crime prevention, it was fully lawful and justified, and 
the actor was worthy of "commendation rather than blame."9 
In stating that an act of crime prevention deserves commen-
dation, even when it entails a homicide, Blackstone suggests the 
intuitively acceptable idea that one who kills to prevent the 
commission of a serious crime furthers the common purpose of 
protecting the essential characteristics of human life. Unfortu-
nately, Blackstone fails to indicate precisely how homicide 
serves that purpose. Because the ~ediate effect of the act is 
to destroy life and to frustrate the state's effort to protect the 
life of the homicide victim, the act seems contrary to that pur-
pose. An effort to understand and evaluate the scope of the de-
fense of crime prevention must begin by identifying more clearly 
the general rationale underlying the defense. 
A. CHOICE OF EVILS THEORY 
At least three rationales for recognizing the defense may be 
considered. The first may be called the "choice of evils" theory. 
According to this theory, the aggressor, who becomes the victim 
of the homicide, has created a situation in which at least one life 
must be lost. Having thwarted the state's effort to protect all 
life, he or she has forced the state to ch90se among the values it 
seeks to protect. Faced with the alternatives of one death or an-
other, the state chooses to protect the life of the innocent actor 
7. See G. FLETCHER, supra note 3, at 798, for a discussion of the difference between 
justification and excuse. 
8. W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 1, at 1432. 
9.Id. 
Women's Law Forum 
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at the cost of that of the aggressor. 
The weighing of values involved in the choice of lives is not 
immediately apparent. If the state allows an innocent actor to 
kill the aggressor, the result is one death. Similarly, if the state 
prohibits such a killing, the result could also be one death. The 
difference between the two possible choices, in this situation, is 
the identity of the life protected. Unless those lives differ in 
value, the state's choice between them is arbitrary. 
If all people are considered equal, and all life is valued 
equally, the choice among lives cannot rest on any judgment of 
the social value of particular individuals or categories of persons, 
as a matter of social utility. But one factor which might be 
weighed is the culpability of the parties. According to this view, 
the aggressor's guilt reduces the value of his or her life, so that, 
in sacrificing that life to the life of the innocent potential victim, 
the state preserves the greater value. If the threatened aggres-
sion is directed at a lesser crime than murder, the value of the 
aggressor's life is reduced proportionately. Depending on the se-
riousness of the crime threatened, the aggressor's guilt may 
bring the value of his or her life to a level below that of whatever 
interest he or she has threatened.10 
At :first glance this analysis seems consistent with the idea 
of punishment by desert; the aggressor deserves to die, and, 
therefore, his or her death is just. But to say that one deserves 
to die does not mean one's life has less value than other lives or 
the interests of others.ll Rather, the principle of"punishment by 
desert is premised on the idea of equality; the natural equality 
between offender and victim is restored by imposing upon the 
offender a deprivation equal to that which he or she has in-
flicted.12 The aggressor's guilt does not reduce the value of his or 
her life. 
The theory of discounting the life of the aggressor according 
to guilt also fails to account for the case in which the aggressor's 
10. G. FLETCHER, supra note 3, at 858. 
11. Kadish, supra note 1, at 880. See also I. KANT, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAw 196 (W. 
Hastie trans. 1887). 
12. 1. KANT, supra note 11, at 196. 
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act is excused, and therefore reflects no guilt. IS For e~ample, if 
the aggressor is a child or an insane person, and therefore not 
responsible for his or her actions, the attempted homicide indi-
cates no moral culpability which could serve as a rationale for 
discounting the value of his or her life. Even under those cir-
cumstances, however, the law permits an innocent person to pre-
vent the homicide by killing the excused aggressor. 
If valuation of the aggressor's life cannot be reduced accord-
ing to guilt, then the "choice of evils" rationale fails entirely to 
explain the privilege of homicidal prevention of non-deadly 
crimes even if it is accepted to explain the privilege to prevent 
murder. If the privilege of self-defense is viewed as a choice by 
the state between the aggression threatened and the aggressor's 
death, it follows that homicide is justified only by threats to in-
terests which outweigh the value of the aggressor's life. Life it-
self, however, is generally regarded as the highest of values.l• 
The value of life suggests that the only threat which would jus-
tify homicide is a threat to life itself.lli But such a strict limita-
tion on the privilege of self-defense has never prevailed in the 
law. 
Some courts and commentators have attempted to rational-
ize the justification of homicide as a defense to lesser threats by 
suggesting that each of the lesser threats included carries an im-
plicit threat to life itself.16 Thus, a "dangerous felony," which 
may be prevented by homicide, is one that carries a "substantial 
risk of death or serious bodily harm";I'1 "serious bodily harm" is 
defined as "harm which creates a substantial risk of fatal conse-
quences."l8 The privilege of self-defense thus extends to preven-
tion of threats of serious bodily harm because such threats carry 
a direct or indirect risk of death. The argument is further ex-
tended to justify homicide in defense of the actor's habitation, 
because the possession of a safe home is necessary to the protec-
13. See G. FLETCHER, supra note 3, at 376; Kadish, supra note 1, at 880. 
14. See note 1 supra. 
15. See Note, Justification for the Use of Force in the Criminal Law, 13 STAN. L. 
REv. 566 (1961). 
16. See J. PERKINS, supra, note 2, at 991; State v. Harris, 222 N.W.2d 462 (Iowa 
S. Ct. 1974). 
17. W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTt', supra note 2, at 406. 
18. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 63(1) (1965). 
Women's Law Forum 
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tion of his or her life from any and all threats. IS 
This theory has also been extended to account for the inclu-
sion of rape in the list of crimes which may be prevented by 
homicide; courts have relied on a presumption of danger to life 
in the act of rape.20 But this presumption involves a failure to 
distinguish between the crime of rape and the other crimes 
which may accompany it. A rapist may kill his victim or may 
inflict bodily injury so severe as to create a risk of fatal conse-
quences; in that case he commits a second crime in addition to 
rape. That second crime threatens life, and would therefore jus-
tify prevention by homicide even without the rape, but the rape 
itself does not necessarily threaten life.21 Unaccompanied byan-
other crime, rape may fit within the category of nonserious bod-
ily harm, defined by the Restatement of Torts as "any physical 
impairment of the condition of another's body, or physical pain 
or illness."22 Although some rapes may be accomplished without 
physical impairment, pain, or illness, the act does necessarily en-
tail such risks. 
When applied to crimes which do carry an inherent risk of 
death, this reasoning fails to account for the equation between 
certain death and risk of death. The actor is permitted to kill 
the aggressor to avoid a danger which poses some possibility of 
his or her own or another's death. The probability ranges from 
the more remote risk involved in an intrusion into one's home to 
the greater risk in the infliction of a gunshot or knife wound. In 
19. See People v. Eatman, 405 m. 2d 491, 91 N.E.2d 387 (1950). 
20. State v. Harris, 222 N.W.2d 462 (Iowa S. Ct. 1974). See also J. PERKINS, supra 
note 2, at 991. 
21. Rape does necessarily carry a risk of pregnancy for those women who are fertile, 
and pregnancy does carry some risk of death. For some women, because of their physical 
or social characteristics, the risk of death in childbirth as a result of rape may be so great 
that a threat of rape would, by itself, carry a substantial risk of death. For these women, 
this reasoning may be adequate to support the privilege. For other potential victims, it is 
at least arguable that, because rape is so often accompanied by other violent crimes, a 
threat of rape is always sufficient to engender in the woman threatened a reasonable fear 
of being killed. If this proposition were accepted, there would be no need for a privilege 
of self-defense against rape; any woman who killed a man attempting to rape her would 
be able to assert the privilege of self-defense against murder, citing the threatened rape 
as evidence of her reasonable fear of death at the hands of her assailant. In that case" the 
question raised by this paper would be a purely hypothetical one: If a woman threatened 
with rape did not experience a fear of death, would she nevertheless be justified in killing 
her assailant to prevent the rape? And if so, why? 
22. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 15 (1965). 
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each case, however, the probability is less than the complete cer-
tainty of death which actually occurs. As long as each life is val-
ued equally, nothing less than 100 percent certainty can out-
weigh the value of the aggressor's life.23 
A somewhat more satisfying variant of the "choice of evils" 
rationale is the theory that, by choosing the life of the innocent 
person over that of the aggressor, the law protects life in general, 
because the aggressor poses a general threat to life, which the 
innocent person does not. Although the two lives in question on 
this occasion have equal value, the loss of one is less an evil than 
the loss of the other; one poses a greater threat of future evil. 
Thus, the state serves its overriding goal of protecting life by 
preferring the life that poses less danger to others. This explana-
tion acknowledges the underlying purpose of state authority and 
of the criminal law, without violating the principle of equality. 
But it rests on an empirical assumption which is open to ques-
tion: that one who attempts to kill on one occasion is more likely 
than .others to do so again. 
The "choice of evils" theory, in all its variations, focuses on 
the relationship between the state and the homicide victim (the 
original aggressor), and seeks to explain the state's willingness to 
permit the death of the aggressor under the circumstances. The 
theory attempts to formulate criteria to measure the social loss 
resulting from a particular death, and to balance the loss against 
the evil threatened by the aggressor. The "choice of evils" the-
ory does not address the rights or interests. of the actor who 
commits the homicide (the victim of the original aggression); it 
merely evaluates the social costs and benefits of the act. 
B. An Hoc DEATH PENALTY THEORY 
A second rationale for the justification of crime prevention 
is that the rule serves to deter crime by operating as sort of an 
ad hoc death penalty; the potential felon is put on notice that he 
or she is subject to homicide at the hands of any person, private 
or official, who acts to prevent the crime. By deterring crime in 
this way, the state serves its general purpose of protecting the 
23. See G. FLETCHER, supra note 3, at 858. 
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essential values of human life.24 
This explanation assumes first that potential felons know of . 
the rule and plan their crimes accordingly. Second, it assumes 
that the threat of death deters crime, an assumption that has 
been widely discredited in the on-going controversy over the 
death penalty.21S Third, the theory assumes that the threat of an 
ad hoc death penalty imposed before or during the act adds to 
the deterrence value of the death penalty to be imposed after 
the crime. In a system of imperfect law enforcement and uncer-
tain punishment, this assumption may have some basis in fact. 
But it seems highly unlikely, at least to this writer, that the 
privilege of self-defense would be eliminated even if law enforce-
ment were perfect and every felon were punished.26 
Even if these empirical assumptions proved correct, how-
ever, the ad hoc death penalty rationale entails two theoretical 
problems. First, if that rationale explains the justification of 
crime prevention, it fails to explain the limitation of that justifi-
cation: the act must be necessary to prevent the crime. If the 
actor's privilege is intended to deter crime, it should logically 
extend to one who kills when the crime could be prevented by 
less drastic means, or even to one who witnesses a crime and 
kills the fleeing felon. 
Second, the ad hoc death penalty theory fails to account for 
cases in which the aggressor's act, although unlawful, is excused. 
Here again, it is useful to consider the example of a child or an 
insane person who is about to kill an innocent person. To put 
such a person on notice that his or her act of aggression may 
result in his or her own death can hardly serve as a deterrent to 
that aggression. Even when applied to excused aggressors, the 
rule may serve to deter other potential felons who would not be 
24. Wechsler & Michael, supra note 3, at 735-36; Erwin v. State, 29 Ohio 186, 200 
(1876). Blackstone lends support to this theory with the observation that any crime "in 
itself capital" may be prevented by the death of the aggressor. W. BLACKSTONE, supra 
note 1, at 1432. See also L. KANOWITZ, WOMEN AND THE LAw 92-93 (1968), observing that 
state laws which excuse or justify a husband's killing his wife's lover establish a rule of 
ad hoc capital punishment for men who commit adultery with married women. 
25. See, e.g., C. BLACK, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: THE INEVITABILITY OF CAPRICE AND 
MISTAKE 25-27 (1974). 
26. See also Kadish, supra note 1, at 880. 
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excused.27 But, if so applied, the rule would use the aggressor for 
the benefit of the rest of the community; it would deprive him or 
her of state protection to increase the protection afforded to the 
potential victims of other aggressors. Such use of the excused 
aggressor would subordinate his or her life and interests to the 
interests of others, denying him or her treatment as the equal of 
all others.28 
The ad hoc death penalty theory, like the "choice of evils" 
theory, focuses on the utility of the act of homicide for the 
state's overall purpose of protecting life generally. It attempts to 
rationalize the state's failure to protect the life of the aggressor 
(victim of the homicide) by balancing the loss of that life against 
the general social benefit resulting from the homicide. The the-
ory does not address any rights or interests of the actor (victim 
of the original aggression) who commits the homicide. 
C. SOCIAL CONTRACT THEORY 
A third theory invokes the concept of a social contract as to 
the source of state authority. Under this view, the state in a civi-
lized society has the exclusive right to use force, because the in-
dividual members of the society have all relinquished to it their 
natural right of self-protection by force. The members of the so-
ciety have joined in the social contract for the sake of the 
greater protection afforded by a common authority. Because the 
state exists for the protection of its members, the social contract 
includes a built-in limitation: each individual retains -his or her 
natural rights for exercise in situations where appeal to estab-
lished authority is impossible. Such a situation arises when ag-
gression is sudden and immediate, so that state intervention 
cannot prevent its effect, and when the effect of the aggression 
threatened would be so severe and lasting that no subsequent 
state response could adequately substitute for prevention. In 
such cases, the parties are no longer fellow citizens whose inter-
action is regulated by a common authority; they are, in Locke's 
phrase, combatants in a "state of war." By depriving his or her 
victim of the possibility of appeal to law, the aggressor bypasses 
the interaction with civil society and loses any claims to its pro-
27. G. FLETCHER, supra note 3, at 815. 
28. [d. 
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tection. The victim of aggression is restored to his or her rights 
under natural law, including the right to protect him or herself 
just as each individual would if no state authority existed.29 
This rationale shifts the focus of analysis from the state':.; 
abandonment of its responsibility to protect the homicide victim 
(the original aggressor) to the natural right of the actor (the 
original victim) to protect those interests for the protection of 
which the state was established in a situation in which state pro-
tection is unavailable. Because the actor has that right naturally, 
and has not relinquished it to the authority of the state, the 
state has no power to prohibit its exercise. Recognition of the 
justification, then, is not a choice by the state to serve its pur-
poses, but an acknowledgement of the limitations on its author-
ity. Those limitations derive from the purposes for which free 
individuals established the state and consented to its imposition 
of a criminal law. 
This rationale applies to the case of the excused aggressor 
as well as that of the culpable aggressor. The essential factor 
which triggers the natural right of self-defense is not the guilt of 
the aggressor, but the victim-actor's lack of opportunity for ap-
peal to the law. The excused aggressor, the child or insane per-
son, may be unwitting, and therefore not responsible. But the 
aggressor's lack of responsibility is irrelevant, because the vic-
tim's act of homicide in self-defense does not constitute punish-
ment of the aggressor or valuation of his or her life. Nor does the 
rule suggest a greater valuation of the life of the victim-actor. 
Rather, the rule simply recognizes the natural right of the actor, 
in the absence of legal authority, to protect his or her own inter-
ests. The lack of legal authority to which to appeal is the result 
of the aggressor's use of force, and it is thus the aggressor who 
triggers the actor's right. But the right itself derives from na-
ture, not from any act or any culpability of the aggressor.30 
The social contract theory is thus consistent with the com-
mon law rule of self-defense, and provides a rationale through 
which the rule may be understood. The common law rule per-
29. J. LOCKE, supra note 2, § 19, at 298; Kadish, supra note I, at 247. See also 
Ashworth, Self-Defense and the Right to Life, 34 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 282, 282-83 (1975); 
Fletcher, supra note 3, at 378. 
30. Fletcher, supra note 3, at 376. 
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mitted homicide when necessary to prevent an act of unlawful 
aggression, without regard to the identity of the aggressor. This 
rule follows logically from the idea that the state's monopoly on 
the use of force extends only to those situations in which state 
protection is available, because the state's authority derives 
from the voluntary association of individuals for the purpose of 
their common security. 
To summarize, the common law rule of crime prevention 
may be best understood through a rationale based on the theory 
of social contract: In situations of necessity, when state author-
ity is unavailable to protect a citizen, the citizen is released from 
the obligation to refrain from the use of force and is restored to 
the natural right of self-protection. 
II. THE SCOPE OF THE DEFENSE: RAPE AS IRREP ARA-
BLE HARM UNDER THE COMMON LAW 
The social contract theory provides a rationale for the privi-
lege of homicide in situations in which state protection is un-
available: the state's monoply on the use of force, because it de-
rives from the voluntary grant of its members' powers of self-
protection, extends only as far as the state's power to protect its 
members. When an act of aggression prevents resort to the com-
mon authority, the individual is restored to his or her natural 
right of self-defense. . 
The privilege of self-defense therefore extends to all acts of 
aggression which preclude resort to state authority. Any event is, 
of course, subject to official response after the fact. In that sense, 
no form of aggression completely precludes state protection. But 
some types of aggression result in injury which is so irreparable 
as to preclude any effective state response after the fact. Be-
cause no subsequent action can fully repair the harm caused by 
such acts, only prevention can adequately protect the citizen 
whose interests are threatened. These forms of aggression, then, 
remove the interaction from the jurisdiction of the common au-
thority and restore to the individual the right of prevention by 
force.31 
31. Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492, 497 (1896) (homicide justified in response 
to threat of "permanent injury"); M. FOSTER, supra note 2, at 274 (homicide to prevent 
rape justified because "the injury intended can never be repaired or forgotten"); J. 
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The privilege of self-defense therefore applies to prevention 
of crimes which have permanent, irreparable consequences. 
Death, of course, is clearly the most permanent consequence of 
an act of aggression; no subsequent governmental action can re-
store the victim's life. The threat of homicide eliminates all pos-
sibility of appeal to authority for prevention of its consequences, 
and thus restores to the victim his or her natural right to use 
force to prevent the act. Similarly, other threats of permanent 
deprivation, such as dismemberment or maiming, render state 
protection unavailable and place the authority for crime preven-
tion in the hands of the individual. 
Every experience is permanent in the sense that its occur-
rence cannot be undone. Even simple assault, once committed, 
cannot be undone by subsequent governmental action against 
the offender. But simple assault does not trigger a right of homi-
cidal self-defense.32 Permanence of the event, therefore, as dis-
tinguished from permanence of the consequences of the event, 
does not adequately describe the type of harm that may legiti-
mately be prevented by homicide. 
The difference between death and dismemberment, on the 
one hand, and simple assault on the other, is in the significance 
of the interest affected, as well as in the permanence of the loss 
of that interest as a consequence of the act. The interest in life 
is indisputably paramount; a deprivation of life, therefore, can-
not be adequately compensated by subsequent events. The in-
terest in physical wholeness also holds a universally recognized 
importance; few people would trade a body part for any form of 
compensation. Moreover, these interests, once lost, are gone for-
ever. The interests affected by a simple assault are less impor-
tant, and they are not forever lost because of a single event. 
Reparation after the fact, therefore, may be sufficient to com-
pensate for the deprivation suffered. 
The type of harm which may be prevented by homicide may 
LOCKE, supra note 2, § 19, at 292 (victim of threatened murder may kill assailant be-
cause threatened loss of life "irreparable"). 
32. See People v. Jones, 191 Cal. App. 2d 478, 482,12 Cal. Rptr. 777, 780 (1961), in 
which the court observes: "A misdemeanor assault must be suffered without the privilege 
of retaliating with deadly force." See also W. LAFAVE & A. SCO'lT, supra note 2, at 393, 
observing that the use of deadly force against a nondeadly attack is never reasonable. 
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be described as not only permanent, but irreparabl~: A depriva-
tion of interests which, like the interest in life itself, are so vital 
to their holder that the permanent deprivation cannot be re-
paired by any form of compensation after the fact. This category 
of harm includes death and dismemberment, but it may also in-
clude whatever other experiences would permanently deprive an 
individual of interests which, in the particular cultural setting, 
are considered crucial to a life worth living.33 
Anglo-American law has consistently included rape among 
the crimes that may be prevented by homicide. This rule reflects 
a social judgment that the harm of rape is irreparable: a depriva-
tion of the interests affected by rape cannot be repaired by any 
subsequent compensation. To evaluate the continuing legitimacy 
of the privilege of self-defense against rape, it is necessary to 
identify that harm and those interests. 
A review of the law of rape and the history of that law indi-
cates that the crime of rape has been viewed as a threat to inter-
ests both of the female victim herself and of her husband, fa-
ther, or other male relative. For the male, rape has been felt as a 
threat to his interests in exclusive possession of a particular wo-
man as a sexual object, either for his own use, in the case of a 
husband, or for transfer to another, in the case of a father or 
other relative. Threatened also has been the male's interest in 
the social status, prestige, and "honor" which he gained through 
exclusive possession of the woman involved. The history of rape 
laws indicates that these interests have been considered of high-
est importance, worthy of the greatest protection available in 
law. 
The interests of the female victim that have received recog-
nition in the law of rape are primarily interests which derive 
33. Wechsler & Michael, supra note 3, at 740, describe the ends, other than preser-
vation of life, that justify homicide as follows: 
Such an end ... must be one the achievement of which by 
common agreement is almost indispensable if life is to be 
worth living ..•• Precisely as homicide is sometimes a neces-
sary means to the preservation of life, it is sometimes a neces-
sary means to the prevention of physical and psychic injuries 
that usually prove to be permanent and seriously impair the 
human capacities of those who suffer them. 
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from her role as a possession of the male. By destroying the ex-
clusiveness of the male's possession of her, rape has destroyed 
her value to him. The law of rape expresses a recognition of the 
female's interest in her value to men, along with the social status 
and material well-being she might derive from it, as an interest 
of great significance. 
The identity of the interests protected by the law of rape 
appears in the language of commentators, in the methods of law 
enforcement, and in the application of the law to cases involving 
women of differing status in relation to the property interests of 
men. 
Common law authorities as well as American cases refer fre-
quently to rape as a violation of the victim's "chastity."s, The 
word "chastity," as used by these sources, means more than vol-
untary abstinence from sexual activity. Abstinence is not even 
suggested when the word is used in reference to a married wo-
man. Rather, the word "chastity," as used by common law 
judges and commentators, connotes conformity with a sexual 
code imposed by law, social convention, and religious doctrine. 
In describing rape as a violation of chastity, these sources indi-
cate that the most significant harm of rape, the harm which is so 
significant as to justify prevention by homicide, is the sexual act 
unapproved by law or social convention. 
The interests protected by the code of chastity are implicit 
in the terms of the code itself; according to law and sexual con-
vention in the Anglo-American world, chastity means premarital 
abstinence and marital fidelity. A chaste woman, therefore, is 
one who grants sexual access to one man alone, permanently and 
irrevocably, becoming his exclusive possession. For a man, a 
threat to chastity is a threat to the exclusiveness of his posses-
sion of the women of his household. For a woman, the depriva-
tion of her own chastity is the deprivation of her capacity to 
grant exclusive access to one man. The interests of both sexes in 
the chastity of women have held a place of such importance that 
their deprivation has been viewed as so irreparable as to warrant 
prevention by homicide. 
34. See, e.g., State v. Martinez, 30 N.M. 178, 187, 230 P. 379 (1924); W. BLACK-
STONE, supra note 1, at 1610; M. FOSTER, supra note 2, at 274. 
15
Fabricant: Homicide and Rape
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1981
960 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 11:945 
The interests protected by the law of rape appear also in 
the exceptions to the prohibition of rape. The most notable ex-
ception, often stated in the definition of rape, is that between 
spouses. The element of force or threat of force may be present, 
but if the aggressor is the victim's husband, no act of sexual in-
tercourse is prohibited by the law of rape.35 
If the law of rape were intended to protect the victim's au-
tonomy or freedom of choice, this exception would be anoma-
lous; the use of force effects the same deprivation of choice no 
matter who applies it. Hale explains the rule by the notion of 
perpetual consent through marriage, but this explanation is a 
legal fiction at best.38 Perkins offers a more persuasive explana-
tion for the marriage exception. According to his definition, rape 
is "unlawful carnal knowledge"-that is, sexual intercourse "not 
authorized by law," and accomplished by force.37 Because the 
law authorizes sex within marriage, no act of sexual intercourse 
between spouses can be unlawful, despite the use of force and 
the absence of consent. Perkins' explanation reveals his under-
standing that the harm of rape is primarily the unlawful sex act, 
the act in violation of chastity, not the use of force to deprive 
the victim of her freedom of choice. A more candid restatement 
of Perkins' explanation of the marriage exception would be that, 
because a wife is the exclusive property of her husband, his use 
of her cannot violate his own property interest in her. According 
to Hawkins, ancient law extended the marital exception to con-
cubinage as well.38 And a similar exception existed for the rape 
35. See generally 1 M. HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 628 (R. 
Stokes & M. Ingersoll eels. 1847); J. PERKINS, supra note 2, at 156; G. STEPHEN, A DIGEST 
OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 156 (7th ed. 1926); MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.4(1) (Tent. Draft No. 
4, 1955) ("not his wife" included in definition). A Connecticut statute, enacted in 1975, 
includes what its authors must have considered a "modem" change in the common law 
rule: "[I]t shall be an affirmative defense that the defendant and the alleged victim were, 
at the time of the alleged offense, living together by mutual consent in a relationship of 
cohabitation, regardless of the legal status of their relationship." CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-
67(b) (West Supp. 1981). A few states have changed their rape laws in recent years to 
eliminate the exception for spouses. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 163.305 (1977), and 
163.375 (1971). 
36. "[F]or by their mutual matrimonial consent and contract the wife hath given up 
herself in this kind unto her husband, which she cannot retract." M. HALE, supra note 
35, at 628. 
37. J. PERKINS, supra note 2, at 156. 
38. "It was anciently said to be no rape to force a man's own concubine." I W. HAw-
KINS, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 122 (J. Curwood ed. 1824). Compare Hawkins with the Con-
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of a slave by the master. Since she was the master's own prop-
erty, his use of her could hardly violate the property interests of 
any other man.39 
If the· law of rape exists to protect the property interests of 
men, and the interests of women which derive from their status 
as the property of men, it would follow that the law's protection 
excludes the rape of a prostitute, who is the property of no man, 
or perhaps of all men alike. And indeed the common law authors 
expresssubstantialdotibtsas· t6wnether a prostitufecanbe· a 
victim of rape. Blackstone reports that "the civil law seems to 
suppose a prostitute or common harlot incapable of any iDjuries 
of this kind; not allowing any punishment for violating the chas-
tity of her who hath indeed no chastity at all, or at least hath no 
regard to it."40 However, Blackstone distinguishes English law, 
which, he explains, punishes the rape of a prostitute because of 
the possibility that she might reform and regain her chastity.41 
Blackstone's explanation assumes that the purpose of the 
law of rape is to protect chastity. The prostitute is protected by 
the law of rape because of the possibility that she might some-
day conform to the code of chastity and deliver herself to the 
exclusive possession of some hypothetical man, whose interests 
would then be violated by any other man's use of her, and whose 
valuation of her would be diminished accordingly. 
Perkins differs with Blackstone on application of the law of 
rape to prostitutes. He observes that a rape differs from the 
prostitute's usual activity only in the absence of payment, so 
that it can hardly be considered an outrage to her. In his view, 
the rape of a prostitute should be treated as a lesser crime, such 
as assault and battery.42 
Although they reach different conclusions, Perkins and 
Blackstone base their views on the same implicit assumptions: 
that the primary harm of rape is the act of sexual intercourse 
outside of a legally sanctioned relationship. Because the prosti-
necticut statute at note 35 supra. 
39. S. BROWNMILLER, supra note 5, at 162-63. 
40. W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 1, at 1610. 
41. Id. 
42. J. PERKINS, supra note 2, at 158. 
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tute engages in such illicit sex regularly, the rape deserves no 
special punishment in Perkins' view. Blackstone's thinking is 
more generous, granting the possibility of reform and conse-
quent restoration to a status worthy of legal protection. 
Modern rape laws include no explicit exception for prosti-
tutes, and no formal requirement of previous chastity on the 
part of the victim. Nevertheless, rape trials often include inquir-
ies into the previous sexual activity of the victim. In theory, 
such evidence is admitted to support an inference of consent on 
the occasion in question based on the fact of consent to similarly 
illicit acts in the past. Whether or not such an inference is fairly 
drawn, the experience of modern rape victims during trials, and 
the infrequency of convictions, suggests that juries and defense 
lawyers may use evidence of the Victim's past sexual behavior to 
support application of an exception for unchaste victims even 
though none exists in the law!8 A woman whose sexual choices 
preclude her the status as one man's exclusive property may still 
be considered unworthy of the law's protection, because no 
man's property interests are affected by her violation, and be-
cause she has chosen to relinquish her ability to grant exclusive 
possession to one man. 
The interests protected by the law of rape appear in the de-
. sign of enforcement mechanisms as well as in exceptions to the 
law. Perhaps the most illuminating example is the ancient He-
brew law, cited by Blackstone, that one who raped an unbe-
trothed virgin must pay a fine to the victim's father and marry 
her with no power of divorce.44 This penalty suggests a scheme 
of reparation for injury to the father's interest in arranging a 
profitable marriage for his daughter. The requirement of mar-
riage without right of divorce served both to relieve the father of 
the burden of maintaining his daughter and to compensate the 
victim herself for the loss of her interest in marriage. All other 
43. See S. BROWNMILLER, supra note 5, at 370-74. See also Tolbert v. State, 31 Ala. 
App. 301, 15 So.2d 745 (1943) (evidence as to murder defendant's previous sexual rela-
tionship with deceased admissible to impeach her credibility on rape claim, thereby dis-
proving her claim of self-defense against rape); State v. Goodseal, 186 Neb. 359, 183 
N.W.2d 258 (1971) (evidence as to murder defendant's activities as a prostitute admissi-
ble to discredit her claim of self-defense against rape). 
44. W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 1, at 1607, citing Deuteronomy 22:25. The rapist was 
punished by death if the victim was betrothed. [d. 
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possibility of marriage had been destroyed with her virginity, 
because she could no longer be offered to a potential husband as 
his exclusive possession. 
Hawkins reports a slightly modified version of this rule in 
early English law. Under the English version, one who raped a 
virgin would be punished with death, "unless such virgin would 
accept of the offender for her husband. ".,,~ This rule placed a 
particularly high priority on the recognized interests of the vic-
tim; by marrying the rapist, she could salvage at least one of the 
benefits that depended on her virginity. The alternative of the 
death penalty for the offender might suggest that the damage to 
the victim's value to her potential husband could at least be 
minimized if the other claimant to possession of her were dead. 
In Hale's time, rape was punished by death. But its prose-
cution occurred only upon instigation by someone in the role of 
a victim. If the woman herself failed to appeal, the right of ap-
peal passed to her husband, or, if the victim was unmarried, to 
her father or his heir. This rule follows quite logically from a 
rape law designed to protect the property interests of men as 
well as the interests of women in preserving their chaste status; 
the husband or father, whose property interest had been vio-
lated, could vindicate that interest in court, regardless of the 
wishes of the victim herself.46 
The interests protected by rape laws in the common law tra-
dition receive additional illumination from consideration of a re-
lated crime, that of stealing an heiress. This felony occurred 
when a propertied virgin was abducted from the custody of her 
parents or guardian and married, "defiled," or both. The com-
mon law writers discuss heiress-stealing in the same chapters as 
rape, and the one crime may be considered a subcategory of the 
other!7 The specific prohibition on stealing an heiress served to 
protect the special interests of propertied families in the orderly 
transfer of land and material wealth though a daughter to her 
husband and children. This particular purpose could, perhaps, 
have been effected by a rule invalidating marriages achieved by 
45. W. HAWKINS, supra note 38, at 121-23. 
46. M. HALE, supra note 2, at 153. 
47. See, e.g., E. COKE, supra note 2, at 60; W. HAWKINS, supra note 38, at 123; G. 
STEPHEN, supra note 35, at 265. 
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abduction. But such a rule would hardly deter the would-be hus-
band, who could well expect the family of a "defiled" and possi-
bly pregnant heiress to prefer him to no husband at all. The act 
of rape was thus an act of possession, rendering both the victim 
and her inheritance the property of the rapist. Although the spe-
cial attraction of an heiress gave rise to the need for a special 
criminal prohibition, the forcible possession of a propertied vir-
gin differed from that of any other woman only in the value of 
the stolen property.48 
As we have seen, rape law in the common law tradition has 
been designed to protect the interests of both men and women 
in the preservation of the chastity of women. The privilege of 
. homicidal self-defense against rape demonstrates the signifi-
cance which the law has recognized in these interests; a threat to 
these interests, . like a threat to life itself, has been viewed as a 
threat of harm so irreparable that prevention is vital. A close 
examination of these interests and of the consequences of their 
deprivation will explain their importance. 
The concept of a man's "honor" as a function of the chasti-
ty of his wife or daughter runs deep in western culture and in 
the Anglo-American legal tradition. That particular form of 
"honor" which derives from the exclusive possession of a woman 
has been regarded as an essential element of the definition of a 
man, comparable to ideals of potency or bravery. A man's status 
in his family and community, his prestige, and his self-esteem 
may all depend on this form of honor. The man who has been 
dishonored by unchastity in the women of his household may be 
ostracized from the ranks of men, much like the one dishonored 
by cowardice in battle. His conformity to the definition of man-
hood is undermined, and his place in the world of men becomes 
uncertain.49 
48. "Eleanor of Aquitaine ••. lived her early life in terror of being 'rapt' by a vassal 
who might through appropriation of her body gain title to her considerable property." S. 
BROWNMILLER, supra note 5, at 17. See also id., at 17-20, on the acquisition of wives 
through rape among primitive peoples of the Philippines and Mrica and among the An-
cient Hebrews (citing the book of J:udges and the story of Dinah in Genesis). 
49. The protection of male honor, defined as exclusive possession of one's wife, has 
been considered so important that a few American jurisdictions have, until recently, per-
mitted a husband to kill a man whom he finds in the act of adultery with his wife. N.M. 
STAT. ANN. § 40A 2-4(7) (1953) (repealed by 1964 N.M. Laws); TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. 
art. 1220 (Vernon) (repealed by 1973 Tex. Gen. Laws ch. 399, § 3 (a»; UTAH CODE ANN. 
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The -importance of masculine "honor," as thus defined, is 
partly a matter of the prestige that derives from property owner-
ship. The owner of material wealth derives social status from his 
property and loses that status if his property is stolen. Similarly, 
the husband or father of an attractive woman gains prestige 
from his prized possession; if she is raped, his possession of her 
is incomplete and his prestige declines accordingly. ISO 
But masculine "honor," more than the price of possession, is 
a symbol of a man's control over his domain and indeed of his 
status as a free man. The western concept of freedom for men 
has implied not only power over one's own activities but also 
control over the use of one's property and over the fate of one's 
dependents. A free man has been defined as one who has the 
capacity to own property and to support and protect his family. 
The rape of a man's wife or daughter, like the theft of his prop-
erty, has undermined his sense of control over his household 
and, with it, his sense of freedom; in his own eyes and those of 
his peers, he is less free, and less of a man than he was before. 
The role of ownership and control as elements of freedom 
maybe seen in common law doctrines regarding robbery and 
burglary, as well as rape. Coke observed that one may kill a rob-
ber on the highway with impunity, "for a man shall never give 
way to a thief .... neither shall he forfeit anything."ISI This 
reasoning indicates a view that the harm of robbery goes far be-
§ 76-30-10(4) (1953). See L. KANOWlTZ, supra note 24, at 92-93. Some courts have car-
ried this rule so far as to deny the adulterer the right to resist the husband's attack 
except by flight. See generally Dabney v. State, 21 So. 211 (Ala. 1897); Drysdale v. State, 
83 Ga. 747, 10 S.E. 358 (1889); Reed v. State, 11 Tex. Crim. 509 (1882). Under the com-
mon law, a husband's killing of his wife's lover was manslaughter, although the common 
law recognized that adultery was "the highest possible invasion of property." W. HAW-
KINS, supra note 38, at 84 n.4. See also M. HALE, supra note 2, at 486. 
50. The importance of the property interest survives into the modem era. 
[The consent standard in rape law] fosters, and is in tum bol-
stered by, a masculine pride in the exclusive possession of a 
sexual object. The consent of a woman to sexual intercourse 
awards the man a privilege of bodily access, a personal 'prize' 
whose value is enhanced by sole ownership ...• an addi-
tional reason for the man's condemnation of rape may be 
found in the threat to his status from a decrease in the 'value' 
of his sexual 'possession' which would result from forcible vio-
lation .... 
Note, Forcible and Statutory Rape, 62 YALE L.J. 55 (1952). 
51. E. COKE, supra note 2, at 55. 
21
Fabricant: Homicide and Rape
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1981
966 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 11:945 
yond the loss of property; such a loss alone would not justify 
prevention by homicide. The harm of robbery, as Coke describes 
it, is the "giving way": The experience of being forced, arbitrar-
ily and under no claim of right, to give up what is rightfully 
one's own, and the impact of that experience on the status of the 
victim as a free man. 
Burglary also justified prevention by homicide under the 
common law, for, according to Coke, "a man's home is his cas-
tle."1>2 The rule suggests that the impact of burglary, like rob-
bery and rape, goes beyond property to the deeper value symbol-
ized by the holding of property: the status of a man as safe, 
secure, and in control of his environment. This status has been 
viewed as a vital element of manhood, essential to the value of a 
man's life. The threat to this status posed by the crimes of rob-
bery, burglary, and rape has thus been viewed as a threat of ir-
reparable harm. 
For the male, then, the chastity of the women close to him 
has been essential to his "honor," which, in turn, has implicated 
his prestige, social status, and self-esteem. The consequences of 
a deprivation of this "honor" have been severe and lasting. Its 
loss through rape has thus been viewed as irreparable. 
For women, too, chastity has been the source of a particular 
kind of "honor," the loss of which has had serious consequences 
for a woman's social status, self-esteem, and material well-being. 
Womanly honor has meant reputation for chastity; and an hon-
orable woman is one who is regarded by her community as in 
conformity with sexual convention and, therefore, available for 
exclusive possession by one man. 
The "honor" of a woman, because of its implications for the 
"honor" of any man with whom she might be associated, has dic-
tated in tlarge measure her value to men. And in a world in 
which women have been dependent on and subordinate to men, 
52. "A man's home is his castle ... for where shall a man be safe if not in his 
house?" ld. at 161. This common law concept has persisted. See, e.g., W. LAFAVE & A. 
SCOTl', supra note 2, at 400. See generally People v. Eatman, 405 lli.2d 491, 91 N.E.2d 
387 (1950); State v. Patterson, 45 Vt. 308 (1873). Some modem sources include a require-
ment that the invader appear to intend to commit a felony against the inhabitants. 
MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.06(3)(d)(ii) (Tent. Draft No.8, 1958). 
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the fate of any particular woman has depended in large part on 
her value to men. A threat of rape has posed to the female vic-
tim a loss of her "honor," with irreparable damage to her value 
to men and with consequent harm to all aspects of her life 
thereafter .5S 
If the victim of rape happens to be a virgin, her loss is per-
manent in a particularly measurable way.r'4, The loss of virginity 
through rape has been described as "defilement" and "deflora-
tion"; these words connote the permanent destruction of a vital 
element of one's value-a permanent stain on one's identity.55 
That stain might destroy her prospects for marriage, which may 
offer the only opportunities for social status and material secur-
ity.56 The victim may also suffer ostracism from both her peers 
and her family as a result of the destruction of her value on the 
scale by which young women have been measured. Along with 
these consequences to her status, position, and future, the rape 
victim also suffers the risk of pregnancy, which would doom 
both her and her child to economic hardship and social 
ostracism.57 
A rape victim who happens to be married might suffer con-
sequences as severe as the maiden's loss of virginity. The wife in 
Anglo-American tradition has depended on her husband for 
financial support, social status, and prestige, and for her own 
sense of identity and value. His esteem for her is vital to every 
element of her well-being. But rape threatens the husband's re-
gard for his wife; it threatens her interests in all the benefits she 
receives' from him. To the extent that the wife's value to her 
husband depends on his exclusive possession of her, the rape 
might cause a loss of his affection and support, comparable to 
53. Kant regards "womanly honor" as such an important interest as to excuse the 
killing by a mother of her illegitimate child. I. KANT, supra note 11, at 202. 
54. See M. FOSTER, supra note 2, at 274. 
55. "Words like 'ravage' and 'despoiled' used to describe the rape victim reflect the 
notion of a stain attaching to the body of the girl." Note, supra note 50, at 72. 
56. The Hebrew and early English rules requiring the rapist to marry his victim may 
have served to compensate the victim for this loss aa well as her father for the loss to his 
status and estate. See also Note, supra note 50, at 70, which states that, in a social 
structure in which marriage is an exchange of sexual access to the woman for economic 
support from the man, "the woman's power to withhold or grant sexual access is an 
important bargaining weapon." 
57. One commentator suggests that the risk of pregnancy may have been viewed as 
the principle harm of rape. G. STEPHEN, supra note 35, at 254. 
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the loss that would result from an act of adultery. In ancient 
Israel, for example, a wife who was raped would be stoned along 
with her assailant, just as if she had committed adultery.lIs This 
rule might reflect a popular disbelief in the occurrence of an ac-
tual rape, and an assumption that the act was in fact adultery; 
but it conveys also a judgment that the victim's role in the act 
carried little significance. Her value to her husband as an object 
in his exclusive possession was destroyed by the event, regard-
less of the wife's behavior. 
A husband's reaction of rejection following the rape of his 
wife has occurred in modern times as well. During the 1970 war 
in Bangladesh, hundreds of thousands of women were raped by 
invading soldiers. And, in accord with Moslem tradition, most of 
the victims' husbands subsequently rejected their wives, despite 
the new government's efforts to persuade the men of the country 
that these women were national heroines.1I9 This response drew 
international attention in an era of mass media and of concern 
over rape as a political issue, but there is every reason to believe 
that the more commonplace occurrence of rape on a city street 
or in a burgled home has provoked similar responses. 
Even if the experience of rape does not cause a husband to 
reject his wife, the loss of her "honor," as defined above, might 
well affect her value as an asset to him, and consequently his 
respect and affection for her.eo In addition to these consequences 
on the raped wife's marriage and related interests, the experi-· 
ence of rape poses to a wife the same very practical risk it poses 
to the unmarried woman: pregnancy, with attendant social and 
financial consequences in the absence of a supportive father-to-
be. 
With a woman's social position, family relationships, and 
financial security dependent on her "honor," which is a function 
of her "chastity," her interest in avoiding rape may be seen as 
comparable to her interest in the preservation of her life. In-
deed, many women have preferred death to rape, and that 
58. s. BROWNMILLER, supra note 5, at 19. The Babylonian rule was the same, except 
that execution was by drowning. Id. 
59. Id. at 79-80. 
60. Brownmiller notes that, "Divorce after rape is not uncommon." Id. at 124. 
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choice has received broad social and religious approval. The Ro-
man legend of Lucretia, for example, tells of a rape victim who 
killed herself to avoid shaming her husband. Her act of heroism 
inspired the Romans to revolt against the Tarquin invaders, in-
cluding Lucretia's assailant, and drive them from Rome. 
Lucretia's suicide expresses her conclusion that the rape de-
stroyed the value of her life, which was dependent on her chaste 
status. Having lost her honor, she was more a liability to her 
husband than an asset, and all she could offer him was proof of 
her spiritual purity through the act of suicide. Lucretia's judg-
ment of her own worth after being raped has been ratified by the 
survival of her act in legend.61 
The heroic female role of the chaste martyr has survived 
into the modern era. In 1902, an eleven-year-old Italian girl 
named Maria Goretti suffered death by stabbing at the hands of 
a potential rapist whose demands she resisted. The rapist admit-
ted later that he had given Maria the choice of submitting to his 
will before he killed her, but she preferred death to unchastity. 
In 1950, Maria Goretti was canonized by the Roman Catholic 
Church.62 
Along with Maria Goretti and Lucretia, women throughout 
history have viewed rape as literally a fate worse than death. 
That view has been sanctioned and perpetuated by religious in-
stitutions and by popular opinion as expressed in literature and 
legend. It is no surprise, then, that the law has allowed women 
to protect themselves from rape through means as drastic as 
they would use to protect themselves from death.68 
61. [d. at 328. 
62. [d. at 330-31. 
63. According to the rule of "utmost resistance," which prevailed for a time in a few 
American jurisdictions, the rape victim ha~ not only a privilege but perhaps even a duty 
to resist by any means available. Under this rule, unless the victim resisted "to the ut-
most," no rape had occurred. The rule suggests a distrust in the credibility of a woman's 
expressions of non-consent; however much she might protest, she is presumed to consent 
unless she resists "to the utmost." But, considering the danger to the woman's life that 
might arise from resistance to an armed and determined rapist, the rule of utmost resis-
tance may also suggest a social judgment that her chastity is as important as her life. 
However, the rule of utmost resistance never prevailed under the common law and has 
died out in those states that once applied it. See, e.g., State v. Hunt, 178 Neb. 783, 135 
N.W.2d 475 (1965); Reynolds v. State, 27 Neb. 90, 42 N.W. 903 (1889); Sowers v. Terri-
tory, 6 Oklo 436, 50 P. 257 (1897); Perez v. State, 50 TeL Crim. 34, 94 S.W. 1036 (1906); 
State v. Hoffman, 228 Wis. 235, 280 N.W. 357 (1938). 
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The loss of a woman's chastity, the chief harm which the 
law has recognized in the crime of rape, has thus threatened ir-
reparable damage to both the victim herself and her male rela-
tives. The law has seen in the act of rape an irreparable loss to 
the victim, susceptible of no adequate compensation or repara-
tion after the fact. The permanence and significance of this 
harm has included rape with murder, in a category of C?rimes the 
prevention of which is a fundamental purpose of the state. Thus, 
-when a situation arises in which state protection against the 
crime is unavailable, the state has found no legitimate role and 
has refrained from interference. Under such circumstances, the 
law has recognized a privilege of the individual to act to prevent 
the crime, just as he or she might if no state authority existed. 
The common law doctrine of a privilege of homicidal self-
defense against rape reflects a recognition of irreparable harm in 
the destruction of chastity through rape. This judgment is prem-
ised on the view that destruction of chastity is the primary harm 
of rape, and that chastity is an interest vital to both men and 
women. These premises have been valid in the context of a so-
cial system in which women hold the status of property, pos-
sessed by men through the sexual act, and valued according to 
the completeness of that possession by a particular man. That 
same system of social values still predominates in many parts of 
the world as well as in certain areas in American society; ele-
ments of it still pervade American culture and law. 
But a process of change has at least begun in both law and 
culture. Although chastity may still be valued as a voluntary ex-
pression of the special love between spouses, it is no longer the 
foundation of honor for either sex, and its loss through rape no 
longer mandates the irreparable 4estruction of social position 
and self-esteem. As chastity has lost its importance, other val-
ues, such as personal autonomy for women, have gained increas-
ing recognition in law and public opinion. A movement has de-
veloped demanding changes in the law of rape to reflect a 
modern understanding of the interests affected by rape, and 
some legal changes have occurred. Rules of evidence in some 
states now prohibit inquiry into the victim's previous sexual ac-
tivity, and a few states have eliminated the exception for forci-
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ble rape between spouses.64 
If a changing understanding of the interests at stake neces-
sitates changes in the law of rape, it also necessitates a re-exami-
nation of the privilege of homicidal self-defense against rape. If 
a threat to chastity is no longer a threat of irreparable harm, it 
cannot provide continuing legitimacy for the privilege. Unless 
rape threatens irreparable harm to some other, newly recognized 
interest, the rule of self-defense is obsolete and deserving of 
change. A critical judgment of the rule of self-defense thus de-
pends on identification and evaluation of the interests at stake. 
m. THE SCOPE OF THE DEFENSE: RAPE AS IRREPAR-
ABLE HARM IN THE MODERN WORLD 
Modern efforts to describe the harm of rape have aban-
doned the language of chastity and focus instead on personal 
harm to the victim. So far these efforts are only initial attempts, 
and no precise statement of the harm of rape is yet available in 
the law. Nevertheless, the decriptions that exist do identify 
some of the interests affected. 
The California Penal Code describes the harm of rape as 
follows: "The essential guilt of rape consists of the outrage to 
the person and feelings of the victim of the rape."65 This defini-
tion lacks precision, but it suggests two of the interests at stake: 
physical integrity and psychological well-being. The United 
States Supreme Court, in Coker v. Georgia,66 recognized a third 
characteristic of the harm of rape, the deprivation of a woman's 
power to choose her sexual partners: 
[Rape] is highly reprehensible, both in a moral 
sense and in its almost total contempt for the per-
sonal integrity and autonomy of the female victim 
and for the latter's privilege of choosing those 
with whom intimate relationships are to be estab-
lished. Short of homicide, it is the "ultimate vio-
64. See, e.g., OR. REv. STAT. §§ 163.305 (1977), 163.375 (1971). 
65. CAL. PENAL CODE § 263 (West Supp. 1981), enacted in 1872. The statutory lan-
guage was amended in 1979 to refer to the person and feelings of "the victim of the rape" 
rather than those of the "female involved." 1979 Cal. Stats., ch. 994, § 3. See also F. 
LUDWIG, RAPE AND THE LAW 3 (1977), in which the author states that the prohibition of 
rape "is designed primarily to protect women from psychical and emotional outrage." 
66. 433 U.S. 584 (1977). 
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lation of self."67 
A close examination of these three interests-psychological 
health, physical integrity, and freedom of sexual choice-may 
lead to a more precise understanding of the harm of rape. It is 
well documented that an experience of rape tends to cause psy-
chological injury to the victim. For some victims, because of 
their age or psychological predispositic;ms, or because of the par-
ticular circumstances of the occurrence, the psychological injury 
may be permanently crippling; for them, the harm of rape is ir-
reparable in the same way that the loss of life or limb is 
irreparable.68 
Whether or not a particular victim suffers serious psycho-
logical damage as a result of rape, the experience necessarily in-
volves a physical invasion of the victim's most private inner be-
ing.69 The social value of personal space is evident in the 
recognition of individual rights of privacy in both law and cul-
ture. The importance of personal space appears also in the elab-
orate system of etiquette that controls bodily proximity in 
everyday interactions. The body, as the "envelope of the self," 
includes the most personal of private spaces.70 Some forms of 
bodily invasion are, of course, trivial aspects of life in soci-
ety-e.g., a hand on the shoulder or bodily contact in a crowd.71 
Medical examinations and treatment are a more significant form 
of bodily invasion which occur under controlled circumstances 
for important reasons. The bodily contact that occurs in sexual 
intercourse goes beyond any of these events to involve the most 
invasive form of contact with the most private of personal 
spaces. The same physical act may be transformed by willing 
participation into a mutual exchange of love; indeed the consen-
sual act derives its significance 'as a form of expression at least in 
67. Id. at 597. 
68. See generally Burgess & Holstrom, Rape Trauma Syndrome, in FORCmLE RAPE: 
THE CRIME, THE VICTIM, AND THE OFFENDER (D. Chappell & R. Geis, G. Geis ed. 1977); E. 
HILBERMAN, THE RAPE VICTIM (1976); C. HURSCH, THE TROUBLE WITH RAPE (1977); F. 
LUDWIG, supra note 65; and S. BROWNMILLER, supra note 5, at ch. 10. 
69. See S. BROWNMILLER, supra note 5, at 376, on bodily invasion in the definition of 
rape. See also E. HILBERMAN, supra note 68, at ix-x, on invasion of personal space as 
violation of the self; G. FLETCHER, supra note 3, at 705, suggesting that consent be 
viewed as a justification for the bodily invasion of sexual contact. 
70. E. HILBERMAN, supra note 68, at ix. 
71. G. FLETCHER, supra note 3, at 705. 
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part from the cultural and psychological importance of the per-
sonal space to which each participant grants the other access. 
But without consent, the sexual act is the most extreme depriva-
tion of physical integrity. 
In addition to bodily invasion, rape involves a deprivation of 
the victim's right of choice over her sexual activity-a violation 
of her autonomy in an area which, for biological, historical, and 
cultural reasons, has great significance. An individual's sexual 
choices reflect factors ranging in importance from the mood of 
the moment to one's readiness to reproduce; among these factors 
may be marital commitments, religious faith or even religious 
vows, personal values, health considerations, and personal taste. 
The rapist overrides all factors, ignoring the victim's preferences 
and demonstrating the predominance of his choices over hers. 
Along with a danger of psychological damage, rape, by defi-
nition, involves a deprivation of physical integrity and auton-
omy. But these interests are also implicated by other violations, 
such as burglary, robbery, false arrest, and kidnapping which do 
not, at least under modern law, trigger a right of homicidal pre-
vention. By examining these crimes and considering how the vio-
lations they involve differ from the violations involved in rape, 
we may identify more precisely the harm of rape. 
An invasion of private space occurs in the crime of burglary 
as well as in rape. A home and its contents may be viewed as an 
extension of the self. An intrusion into one's dwelling space may 
be experienced as a violation comparable to the violation of bod-
ily space.72 But the space involved, while identified with the in-
dividual as an extension of his or herself, is still separate from 
the individual. The burglary victim can disassociate himself or 
herself from the violated space and establish a new home, if the 
experience is so traumatic as to warrant such a response. But 
the rape victim is intimately and inseparably connected to the 
72. E. HILBERMAN, supra note 68, at ix. As we saw before, the significance of bur-
glary in the common law reflected the importance to the male head of household of con-
trol over his domain as a symbol of his identity as a free man. But a man's control over 
his household has lost at least some of its former importance for his status, and this 
change is reflected in the modem rule that one may kill to prevent burglary only if one 
reasonably fears that the burglar intends to commit a felony against the inhabitants of 
the home in addition to the felonious entry. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.06(3)(d)(ii) 
(Tent. Draft No.8, 1958); W. LAFAVE & A. Scon, supra note 3, at 400. 
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space which is violated by the crime; that space is not merely an 
extension of her, replaceable at will, but her own body.'Z3 
Although the experience of physical invasion may be per-
ceived as the most immediate offense of rape, the physical act 
involved constitutes an invasion rather than an event of a wholly 
different character simply because it occurs without choice. The 
deprivation of choice, then, is the primary offense and deserves 
close examination. 
Deprivations of autonomy occur in robbery, false arrest, and 
kidnapping as well as in rape. The robbery victim is, in Coke's 
words, forced to "give way";'Z3.1 that is, he or she is deprived of 
the freedom to choose between retaining property and relin-
quishing it. Control over one's property once carried such signifi-
cance for the definition of a man that its deprivation through 
robbery could legally be prevented by homicide. But the cultural 
significance of this form of autonomy has lessened, so that the 
modern rule permits homicide in prevention of robbery only if 
the victim reasonably fears death or serious bodily harm.'Z· The 
difference between the deprivation of autonomy inflicted by rob-
bery and that inflicted by rape is in. the particular choices which 
the victim is prevented from making, and the cultural signifi-
cance assigned to those choices. When the freedom to control 
one's property symbolized the status of a free man, the depriva-
tion of that freedom was viewed as irreparable harm. If sexual 
freedom holds a comparable symbolic value in modern culture, 
then its deprivation similarly constitutes irreparable harm, trig-
gering a privilege of self-defense. 
73. The only other crime which involves a violation of such intimate personal space 
is forcible sodomy, which both the common law and modern statutes have unanimously 
held to justify prevention by homicide. W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 1, at 1579-80; MODEL 
PENAL CODE § 3.04(2)(b)(i) (Tent. Draft No.8, 1958); See also People v. Collins, 189 Cal. 
App. 2d 575, 11 Cal. Rptr. 504 (1961); State v. Robinson, 328 S.W.2d 667 (Mo. S. Ct. 
1959). 
. 73.1 E. COKE, supra note 2, at 55. 
74. W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, supra note 3, at 400. See also J. LOCKE, supra note 2, at 
125-26, observing by way of analogy to robbery than an attempt to enslave also creates a 
privilege to kill, since enslavement would give the aggressor the power to destroy the 
victim's life. The analogy suggests the importance of autonomy as both a symbolic ele-
ment of personhood and a source of capacity for self·protection. See also E. HILBERMAN, 
supra note 68, at ix-x, on the violation of self and the consequent psychic stress involved 
in robbery. 
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The victim of false arrest is also deprived of autonomy; he 
or she loses freedom of movement during the period of deten-
tion, and may also suffer indignity, inconvenience, and damage 
to reputation. Nevertheless, false arrest has not traditionally 
been held to justify prevention by homicide, although it has 
been viewed as provocation sufficient to reduce homicide from 
murder to manslaughter.71> 
The deprivation of autonomy involved in false arrest differs 
from that involved in rape in at least two respects. First, as in 
the case of robbery, it differs in the cultural significance assigned 
to the particular choices which the victim is prevented from 
making. A deprivation of freedom of movement for a short pe-
riod of time, although important, does not carry the degree of 
significance for an individual's status as a free person that the 
deprivation of control over one's property or over one's house-
hold once carried, or that a deprivation of sexual freedom may 
carry today. A second, and perhaps even more important differ-
ence, is that false arrest occurs under a claim of right, which 
includes an implicit recognition of the victim's status as a free 
person; the victim is guaranteed due process, through which he 
or she can expect vindication in due course. Thus, although the 
victim is temporarily unable to exercise autonomy, his or her 
status as a person with general rights of autonomy is not 
impaired. 
Kidnapping also involves a deprivation of freedom of move-
ment. The deprivation involved in kidnapping is greater than 
that involved in false arrest, because it may be prolonged and 
because it occurs under no claim of right. Case law and commen-
tary on the question of self-defense against kidnapping is scarce, 
perhaps because a kidnapping which would not support the vic-
tim's reasonable fear of death is so unimaginable that a separate 
rule for kidnapping has been unnecessary. Neither common law 
writers nor most modern statutes include kidnapping in their 
lists of crimes that justify homicidal self-defense,76 although, of 
75. W. LAFAVE & A. SC01T, supra note 3, at 396-97. But see Perdue v. State, 5 Ga. 
App. 821, 63 S.E. 922 (1909); State v. Bethune, 112 S.C. 100, 99 S.E. 753 (1883), for a 
contradictory judicial view. See generally Chevigny, The Right To Resist an Unlawful 
Arrest, 78 YALE L.J. 1128 (1969). 
76. Some statutes encompass kidnapping. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 35.15(2)(b) 
(McKinney 1968); ILL. ANN STAT. ch. 38, § 7-1 (Smith-Hurd 1962). 
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course, an act of kidnapping could trigger a right of self-defense 
by providing evidence of a threat of death, serious bodily harm, 
or rape.'1'1 Kidnapping alone, however, unaccompanied by other 
crimes, involves only a deprivation of autonomy. Like false ar-
rest, kidnapping differs from rape to the same extent that free-
dom of movement differs in cultural significance from sexual 
freedom. 
The deprivation of autonomy that occurs in rape differs 
from the deprivation involved in these other crimes in the na-
ture and significance of the choice that is prevented; the extent 
of the harm of rape, then, depends on the importance of sexual 
autonomy for women in modern American culture. If a woman's 
sexual autonomy is an essential characteristic of her status as a 
free person, comparable in significance to the "honor" of a man 
or woman under the common law, then rape still causes irrepa-
rable harm and should still trigger a right of homicidal self-
defense. '18 
Two aspects of a woman's sexual autonomy give it particu-
lar importance: first, the role of sexuality as a means of emo-
tional expression, and second, the history of denial of sexual 
freedom to women. The significance of sexual freedom as a char-
acteristic of personhood derives, at least in part, from the impor-
tance of sexuality as a means of emotional expression. The de-
velopment and expression of emotional bonds, separate from the 
urges of biology or instinct, is one of the characteristics of 
human life that distinguishes people from all other animals. The 
ability to express feelings of love is fundamental to the human 
quality of a person's life. The rape victim is deprived of sexual-
ity as a medium of emotional expression, on the occasion of the 
rape and perhaps thereafter as well. The memory of an act of 
sex without choice, performed by the rapist and experienced by 
the victim as an expression of contempt rather than of love, may 
77. w. BLACKSTONE, supra note 1, at 1714, specifies fine and imprisonment, rather 
than death, as punishment for kidnapping. In light of his capital punishment standard 
for self-defense, the penalty suggests that kidnapping does not justify homicidal 
prevention. 
78. See G. FLETCHER, supra note 3, at 706, observing that changing attitudes toward 
chastity should not be regarded as reducing the harm of rape, because U[t]he more seri-
ously one takes the sexual autonomy of adult men and women, the more incriminating 
an act of forcible intercourse." 
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cause the victim to associate sexuality with the emotions she felt 
on that occasion. That association could impair her ability there-
after to experience sexual intercourse as an expression of love 
given and received. That result severely impairs her identity as a 
human being. 
Sexual freedom carries additional significance for women 
because it is a type of autonomy which they have only recently 
acquired, if they have it at all. Freedom of sexual choice has not 
been a characteristic historically associated with women; indeed 
it may be safe to say that most women throughout history have 
had little or no autonomy in sexual matters. For this reason rape 
has been viewed as a crime against the victim's "chastity" or her 
husband's property rights, but seldom as a violation of the vic-
tim's own liberty. 
Deprivation of sexual· freedom has been one of the most ef-
fective means by which women have been denied the status of 
persons and reduced to the status of property. That men have 
had sexual autonomy while women have not has stood as a sym-
bol of the subordinate position of women in relation to men. 
While men have been free people, capable of making choices and 
acting upon their own choices, women have been the objects of 
those choices, acted upon but prevented from acting on their 
own behalf. '79 
The deprivation of sexual autonomy in rape has functioned 
as a symbol of the power of men over women. Rape has been 
used in primitive cultures as a form of ritual discipline, applied 
by groups of men to women who rebel against the restraints of 
the feminine role.so The rape of an unknown woman on a mod-
ern city street may be another form of the same type of discipli-
nary action. The man who simply assumes that a lone woman is 
a fair target is, in a sense, punishing his victim for presuming to 
79. The value that men have always placed on their own sexual autonomy is evident 
in the rule that forcible sodomy justifies prevention by homicide. See note 73 supra. See 
also s. BROWNMILLER, supra note 5, at 257-68, on homosexual rape in prisons as a 
method of "conquest and degradation," through which physically strong men achieve 
status in a social hierarchy by forcing weaker men to act as passive sexual objects, the 
role assigned to women in the outside world. 
80. S. BROWNMILLER, supra note 5, at 284-85, reports on systematic gang rape as a 
method of punishment for rebellious women among primitive tribes in New Guinea and 
Brazil. 
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think that she may live an independent life free of male protec-
tion. Both the men of the primitive tribe and the rapist on the 
modern city streets use rape to preserve and enforce the 
supremacy of men over women in their societies. Through a 
graphic reminder of women's lack of sexual choice, they remind 
the rape victim and all other women of their overall subordina-
tion to men. 
Rape operates to dehumanize women further when, as often 
occurs during warfare between nations, classes, or races, men 
rape to degrade other men through violation of "their" women.81 
Under these circumstances, the woman's right to sexual freedom 
is denied even the recognition inherent in its deliberate viola-
tion. Her body is the battleground for a struggle between men, 
and the violation of her autonomy is only an incidental by-
product of warfare in which she does not otherwise participate. 
This form of rape serves to impress upon all women that they 
are not free persons, possessing rights of autonomy and integ-
rity. They are, rather, items of property existing for use both by 
and against their male owners. 
Because of the history of its denial, sexual autonomy for wo-
men carries an importance that goes well beyond the significance 
of sexuality as a means of emotional expression. Freedom of sex-
ual choice symbolizes the full and independent personhood that 
women are only beginning to achieve. The deprivation of that 
freedom through rape symbolizes revival of the subordinate sta-
tus to which women were so long relegated. 
The harm of rape in the modern world, then, is the same as 
the harm which the common law recognized in burglary, rob-
bery, or the rape of a man's wife or daughter. Just as the male 
head of household who suffered these crimes experienced an ir-
reparable blow to his "honor"-his status as a free man in con-
trol of his environment and possessions-so the modem rape 
victim may experience irreparable damage to her precarious sta-
tus as a full-fledged human being, in control of herself, her body, 
and her sexuality. Through the deprivation of interests which 
symbolize the status of a free person, interests in bodily integ-
rity, sexual autonomy, and the capacity to freely and actively 
81. See generally id., at cbs. 3, 4 & 7. 
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participate in sexual activity as a form of emotional expression, 
the rape victim is deprived of her personhood just as, according 
to the social perceptions underlying the common law rules, the 
male victim of robbery or burglary, or the husband or' father of a 
rape victim, was deprived of his personhood. The deprivation 
that occurs in the modern rape is irreparable for the same rea-
son that those deprivations were considered irreparable: Because 
no subsequent legal proceeding can adequately compensate for 
the loss which the victim has suffered. No amount of monetary 
damages could make the victim whole, because the value of the 
lost sense of personhood is immeasurable, and no punishment 
inflicted on the perpetrator could provide full vindication to the 
victim. Because compensation is impossible, prevention is essen-
tial. The modern rape victim, therefore, like the victim of bur-
glary, robbery, or rape under the common law, has the right to 
prevent the crime by any means necessary, including homicide. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The privilege of self-defense is a form of recognition in the 
criminal law of the purposes of the state and the limitations on 
state authority. If government is a creation of free individuals, 
established for the purpose of protecting the interests of its 
members in their lives as human beings, then the authority of 
government ends when it is unable to serve that purpose. An 
individual who faces an immediate threat of irreparable damage 
to his or her interests in human life is therefore freed of legal 
restraint and privileged to employ any means necessary to pre-
vent that deprivation. 
Human life involves more than mere biological existence. 
The rules of self-defense, which have always permitted the use 
of deadly force in prevention of certain nondeadly crimes, ex-
press a universal judgment that certain interests are so impor-
tant to the human quality of life that life without them does not 
deserve the designation "human." One who loses these vital in-
terests, according to the universal judgment expressed in the law 
of self-defense, is no longer fully a person. The identity of those 
interests is a matter of social judgment within each culture, sub-
ject to change as cultural values change. 
The rules of self-defense under the common law reflect a set 
of cultural judgments identifying the interests considered crucial 
35
Fabricant: Homicide and Rape
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1981
980 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 11:945 
to personhood. For men, these interests have included the status 
of a free man, in control of his actions and his environment, in 
full possession of whatever material wealth he may own, and 
perhaps most important, in full and exclusive possession of the 
women of his household. For women, these interests have in-
cluded chastity and "honor," a status of bodily purity defined as 
sexual "possession" by one man alone. 
These cultural judgments have changed through time, so 
that in modern American society the control over material pos-
sessions carries less significance for a man's personhood than it 
once did. Cultural changes now in progress are rendering obso-
lete the concept of a man's "possession" of a woman through 
sexuality, so that the chastity of a woman now carries less signif-
icance. The threat of such a deprivation therefore no longer jus-
ti:fies a homicidal response. 
But other interests have increased in the value accorded by 
cultural judgment. Personal autonomy, particularly in matters of 
sexuality, and bodily integrity are two of the most important 
values in modern society, values that modern American culture 
considers vital to the identity of an individual as a full and free 
person. For women, who have long been denied these essential 
elements of humanity, these interests carry particular signifi-
cance in the definition of personhood. 
Rape is an actual and symbolic deprivation of the victim's 
vital interests in sexual autonomy and bodily integrity. The ex-
perience of rape thus irreparably impairs the victim's status as a 
full and free person. As a deprivation of personhood, or of life as 
a human being, rape is one of the occurrences that government 
exists to prevent. Where government intervention is unavailable, 
however, and no less drastic method would prevail, prevention 
may occur through an individual's use of the deadly force usu-
ally reserved for the state. By declining to prohibit or punish the 
use of deadly force under such circumstances, the cri:minal law 
expresses a recognition of the origin and purposes of the state 
and of the limitations on its power. 
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